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ABSTRACT
Whereas the extant literature has found much similarities in determinants and correlates of
individual attitudes toward immigration to Europe there is less attention on Europe’s
regional-based attitudes. We try to unpack this puzzle by accounting for attitude variations
that the 2015 Europe’s refugee crisis brought about in three geopolitical regions of the
continent, namely EU member countries from former communist Eastern Europe, EU
member countries from Western Europe and non-EU Western countries. We argue that
whereas some socioeconomic factors and other attitudinal variables predict the same
reaction toward more/less immigration from poor countries outside Europe, trust in
institutions and their perception as the locus of policymaking predict different attitudes
toward such migration. We found that, indeed, the 2015 refugee crisis sparked different
reaction between the European East and the European West related to their willingness to
admit more/less immigrants. Those findings suggest that much of attitudinal differences
related to immigration in Europe can be understood as a product of people’s perception
over the locus of policy responsibility, and that the 2015 refugee crisis and the ensuing
increased salience of the immigration has helped to crystallize differences in locating such
responsibility. We test our hypotheses with a dataset that combines data from the 7th and 8th
rounds of the European Social Survey, which happened in 2014 and 2016, respectively.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Whereas recent electoral results in Germany and Italy show that the 2015 refugee crisis in
Europe has impacted EU member country’s public opinion on immigration, and that impact
could affect domestic politics and policies, we lack, to our knowledge, a systematic account
on any possible attitudinal differences brought about by the refugee crisis in various
European geopolitical regions. As the EU enlargement has contributed to blur Europe’s
East-West divisions along economic and political lines, the question remains whether or not
public attitudes on both sides of the continent are catching up with each other in various
issues. It is worth inquiring whether or not there exist differences on how the crisis has
impacted attitudes of Europeans from both sides of the continent on immigration from poor
countries outside the continent. Could the civic Western European versus the ethnic Eastern
European national identity dichotomy affect different attitudes toward immigration in the
continent? Whereas there is a growing body of literature explaining Europeans’ attitudes
toward immigration, there is little comparison between such attitudes in the western part of
the continent and their former communist, Eastern European counterparts (for exceptions
see Ceobanu and Escandell (2008) and Halapuu et al. (2013)). Answering such questions
carries both the theoretical importance of understanding possible intracontinental attitudinal
differences toward immigration (or ruling them out altogether), and the practical
importance of designing EU and domestic public policies accordingly. Moreover, those
answers would elucidate the intersectional character of European geopolitics and political
culture, and inquire into whether or not the EU has been able to establish an overarching
normative behavior on public opinion toward immigration.
We tested whether the 2015 Europe’s refugee crisis brought about changes in Europeans’
attitudes toward immigration from poor countries outside Europe, and whether or not there
are attitudinal differences over immigration from outside the continent among people living
in EU’s opposing sides of the former Iron Curtain. In the debate of whether or not there are
intracontinental attitudinal differences that could be explained by the civic patriotism
versus ethnic nationalism dichotomy and those who find such a dichotomy not to be a
useful tool, we tend to rest in the between. We argue that, whereas there are differences that
could be explained by that dichotomy, another important group of correlates could be
6

people’s relationship with and trust in their political elites and institutions. We tested our
argument by applying multilevel analysis on a series of ordered probit models built with
European Social Survey (ESS) data from the 7th and 8th rounds. The ESS 7 was held in
2014 and the ESS 8 was held in 2016, whereas the peak of Europe’s refugee crisis
happened in 2015, right between the two rounds. We included in our dataset all the 19
countries where both rounds were held, and divided them in three regions, the EU East, the
EU West and the non-EU West.
We found both similarities and differences across all the three geopolitical regions. The
main difference is the impact of the 2015 crisis on people’s willingness to admit more/less
immigrants from poor countries outside Europe. However, we found that those differences
seem to be confined with, and reflect people’s position toward, national and EU
institutions, but do not consistently spill outside them. In line with our argument, we found
that Eastern Europeans tend to associate their attitudes toward more immigration from poor
countries outside Europe only with their trust in the European Parliament but not with
domestic politicians and institutions; EU Western Europeans tend to associate such
attitudes with both domestic politicians and institutions and the European Parliement; and
non-EU Western Europeans tend to associate attitudes toward such immigration only with
domestic politicians and institutions. However, we found that the post-crisis conditions
brought about some balance between the EU East and the non-EU East regarding the locus
of policy responsibility: citizens from both sides associate their attitudes toward
immigration with national parliaments and the European Parliament. However, the very
post-crisis conditions and the salience that they brought to the issue also crystallized
differences between East and West regarding directional association of people’s trust in
institutions and their attitudes toward immigration. What makes the EU East and the EU
West similar is citizens’ inclination to associate their attitudes toward immigration with
national parliaments and the European Parliament), and what make them differ are the
opposing directional signs. On the other hand, citizens from the EU West and the non-EU
West share their inclination to associate their attitudes toward immigration with trust in
domestic politicians and institutions according same directional signs. However, a number
of variables similarly affect or associate the dependent variable across the three regions. We
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conclude that, whereas the new European political realities have encroached upon
intracontinental cleavages along political culture lines, some differences persist and affect
people’s different attitudes over immigration from poor countries outside the continent.
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2
2.1

LITERATURE REVIEW
The East-West National Identity Cleavages and their Impact on People’s
Political Attitudes

Answers of our research question are embedded into the answer of a larger question: are
there attitudinal differences between the European geopolitical West and East? Most of the
existing literature converges toward finding both similarities and differences between
Eastern and Western Europeans, and highlighting those similarities and differences
becomes paramount in explaining any differing attitudes toward immigration from outside
Europe into their continent. Arguably, among the starkest differences are the different
versions of national identities and their associated different nationhood concepts (Hjerm,
1998, 2003; Jones, 1997; Jones & Smith, 2001; Shulman, 2002; Smith, 1991; Wright &
Reeskens, 2013).
Kohn’s (1944) conceptualization of the distinction between nationhood’s civic West
European and ethnic East European conceptions has pioneered a large body of research
dealing with understanding the very nature of each of them as well as their relationship
(Greenfeld 1993; Ignatieff 1993; Brubaker 1996; Schöpflin 1996; Plamenatz, 1976; Smith,
1986, 1991; Kolstø 2000). Despite a lack of consensus about the exact nature and
implications of the distinction, the civic nation is defined as political construct where
allegiances rest on political concepts and principles, while the ethnic nation rests on
perceptions of and loyalty to specific ethnic characteristics. The ethnic type of nationhood
puts an emphasis on fixed, static and sequential ascriptive requirements for national
membership such as genealogical descent, race, ethnicity, and place of birth (Bar-Tal &
Staub, 1997; Connor, 1994; Smith 1986, 1991). On the other hand, the civic conception of
nationhood views it as a matter of choice, considering it as a bundle of shared political
principles, subjective ascription to a nation, and equated citizenship. The concept of civic
nation is sometimes equated with the idea of the liberal state, while the ethnic nation is
defined as an illiberal version of state-formation (Ignatieff 1993).
As “a collective sentiment based upon the belief of belonging to the same nation and of
sharing most of the attributes that make it distinct from other nations” (Guibernau, 2007/9:
11), national identity associates the two different interpretations of what constitutes a nation
9

(Brubaker, 1992; Greenfeld, 1992; Smith, 1991; Bar-Tal 1997; Schatz and Staub 1997;
Blank and Schmidt, 2003). Scholars working on national identity have defined patriotism as
feelings of attachment to one’s nation, whereas nationalism as viewing one’s nation
superior to others (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Blank and Schmidt, 2003; de Figueiredo
& Elkins, 2003; Esses et al., 2004). This conceptualization relates patriotism with concerns
for the well-being of one’s nation, national unity and civic involvement, and nationalism
with xenophobia and hierarchy legitimizing ideologies (Bar-Tal and Staub, 1997; Schatz,
Staub, & Lavine, 1999; Ariely, 2011; Kemmelmeier and Winter, 2008). Nationalists
support social homogeneity, blind obedience and idealized excessive evaluation of their
own nation; patriots, on the other side support heterogeneous structures within society and a
critical distance to the state and the regime (Blank and Schmidt, 2003).
Research has found differing impact of patriotism and nationalism on people’s political
attitudes and behavior, especially in policy areas tightly related with political culture and
ideological affiliation (Hadarics 2016). In intergroup relations, nationalism predicts
aversion toward multiculturalism and immigration and a longing for cultural purity,
whereas patriotism seems either not to be related to intergroup attitudes (Schatz & Staub,
1997; Spry & Hornsey, 2007), or to tolerance toward minorities and foreigners (Blank and
Schmidt 2003; de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Esses et al., 2004). In a wider picture,
nationalism seems to predict more secondary emotions (e.g., optimism, compassion,
melancholy, and guilt) to ingroups versus outgroups, while patriotism negatively predict the
differential attribution of secondary emotions to ingroups versus outgroups (Viki and
Calitri 2008; Leyens et al 2001).
However, a small but growing body of literature has been able to challenge both
theoretically and empirically the European cleavages according to the patriotismnationalism dichotomy (see Kuzio, 2001, 2002; Kymlicka, 1995, 1999, 2000, 2001;
Nieguth, 1999; Yack, 1999; Ceobanu and Escandell 2008; Hjerm, 2003; Janmaat, 2006;
Jones and Smith, 2001a,b; Shulman, 2002). This critiques rests on the claim that all nationstate constructions depend on a core of ethnic thinking (Kuzio 2002). As such, the
“ethnocultural neutrality” of Western liberal states is a myth, and that the East-West
comparison of nation-building processes needed to follow a bi-directional approach
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(Kymlicka 2000). Admitting a borderline between the two distinct national identity models,
other authors have argued against viewing them necessarily as mutually exclusive (Hjerm,
2003; Shulman, 2002). As Ceobanu and Escabdrell (2008: 1150) put it, “the question
should not be one of if but, rather, how much ethnic straw is needed for the fabrication of
political bricks, apart from the civic clay.” Therefore, just as we should expect an overlap
between the civic and ethnic representations of the nation (Ceobanu and Escandell 2008),
so should we expect an overlap of people’s attitudes and policy preferences in both sides of
the continent.

2.2

Determinants and Correlates of People’s Attitudes Toward Immigration from
Outside Europe

The dramatic Europe’s 2015 refugee crisis brought about a salience increase of immigration
issue. Since crisis are exceptional events, they could interrupt existing narratives and create
opportunities for promoting newly emerging interpretations of an issue (Horsti 2008a;
Nossek 2008). Presumably, the salience weights are relative (e.g. they add up to one) rather
than absolute (Hatton 2017); due to bounded rationality individuals must choose what is
more important to them among various preferences (Simon, 1985; Kahneman, 2011).
Therefore, individuals must choose among alternatives, and an increasing salience in other
issues reduces the salience in immigration (Hatton 2017). And since salience is often
measured by media coverage (Gentskow, 2007; Ashworth 2012; Strömberg, 2015), there is
abundant literature to bolster claims that media’s coverage of the 2015 refugee crisis
increased immigration salience to the European public (Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017;
Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017). Indeed, using Eurobarometer data, we calculated that
the mean for the variable “immigration as an important issue” increased in the EU East
from .06 in 2014 to .19 in 2016; and in the EU West increased from .18 in 2014 to .24 in
2016 (the Eurobarometer provided no data for the non-EU Western European countries).
Therefore, we should expect that the 2015 refugee crisis to have caused among Europeans
attitude change toward immigration from poor countries outside Europe.
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In spite of criticism, research continues to highlight important differences between public
opinions in Eastern and Western Europe. (Burjanek, 2001; Kunovich, 2002; Rohrschneider,
1999). Those differences include differing preferences in policy areas such as welfare
(Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Lipsmeyer & Nordstrom, 2003; Redmond, Schnepf, &
Suhrcke, 2002; Roosma, Gelissen, & van Oorschot, 2013; Suhrcke, 2001). One argument
holds that in West more than in East Europe, popular dissatisfaction with policies and
governmental actions is remarkably visible during certain periods of time, making
exclusionary attitudes more overt (Ireland 1997; Wallace 1999). On the other hand, social
upheavals and wars that associated the disintegration of several communist federations
seem to indicate the persisting power of the exclusionary ethnonationalism in Eastern
Europe. The persistence of such ethnic exclusionism in this region indicates that attitudes of
intolerance toward foreigners and immigrants remain widespread among Eastern European
publics, who appear to be more exclusionary than Westerners even though the immigration
rates of the post-communist countries are significantly smaller than those of their Western
counterparts (Okólski, 2000). Therefore, we expect Eastern Europeans to be on average less
supportive to more immigrants from poor countries outside Europe. Moreover, if the West
civic patriotism versus East ethnic nationalism dichotomy holds, we should expect the
exclusionary nature of Eastern European ethnic nationalism to inflict opposition in Eastern
Europe to immigration, but the inclusionary nature of Western European nationalism to
bring about support for more immigration from poor countries outside Europe.
Halapuu et al. (2013) define institutional trust as people’s belief that country’s institutions
do not harm them, at least not willingly, and act in everybody’s interests. The limited
literature that link people’s trust in institutions with their attitudes toward immigration
argue that social and political alienation impact attitudes towards immigrants; if people feel
livelihood insecurity and neglect by their politicians, they tend to show more negative
attitudes towards immigrants (Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996). Other authors have
found that trust in state institutions could prevent negative attitudes towards immigrants
(Husfeldt 2004). Generalized as political trust, institutional trust could expand over trust in
elites, politicians and political parties.
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The 2015 refugee crisis in Europe provoked strong sentiments and reactions regarding both
humanitarian feelings associated with a growth of human solidarity and support, and
negative reactions associated with fears of terrorism and national identity erosion
(Georgiou and Zaborowski 2017). There is a growing body of literature that discuss how
information sources shape people’s policy preferences. By having greater access to the
mass media, politicians play a significant role in shaping the public discourse related to
immigration and refugees, thus directly impacting public opinion on this issue (Ray 2003).
Such capability to cue the general public would mean that politicians transfer to the masses
their growing anti-immigrant sentiments, causing higher levels of nationalism among the
public (Smith Keller 2016). In turn, people use elites and institutions as informational
shortcuts in order to inform their perceptions and preferences on policies, and help to locate
and/or place responsibilities about those policies (Brader et al., 2013 Druckman et al.,
2013; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Tilley and Hobolt, 2011). Moreover, it has been argued
that a strong civic national identity that associates patriotism has a positive impact on
political trust, whereas a strong ethnic national identity that associates nationalism has a
negative impact on political trust (Berg and Hjerm 2010) Therefore, whereas we argue in
favor of the association between trust in domestic politicians and institutions and attitudes
toward immigration, we do not make a prediction about the directional sign of that
association.
However, the established consensus is that citizens are disinterested in the EU, and do not
respond to information provided by the EU, thus making the latter unable to serve as
informational shortcut (de Vreese et al., 2006; Follesdal and Hix, 2006; Hix and Marsh,
2007, 2011; Hobolt et al., 2013; Hobolt and Tilley, 2014; Weber, 2011). However, Page
(2017) has argued that people’s opinions and attitudes might not be as insulated from the
influence of institutions as previously argued, and that the EU possesses a greater influence
on public opinion than the established consensus presumes. According to this argument,
citizens’ interests in and attitudes toward the EU would make them object policies
promoted by the EU. Also, people’s position versus their countries’ EU membership seem
to guide their responsibility assignment toward policy issues. Moreover, it has been argued
that a strong civic national identity that associates patriotism has a positive impact on
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political trust, whereas a strong ethnic national identity that associates nationalism has a
negative impact on political trust (Berg and Hjerm 2010), but we don’t know how trust in
EU institutions would associate attitudes toward an issue of increasing salience such as
immigration in Europe from poor countries outside Europe. Hence, whereas we argue in
favor of the association between trust in institutions and attitudes toward immigration, we
do not make a prediction about the directional sign of that association.
Literature that relates anti-immigration attitudes with people’s attitudes toward EU
integration develops in two interrelated streams: perceptions of threats that immigration
presents to their resources and people’s fear of losing social cohesion and national
identity (McLaren 2002). Those attitudes are related to intolerance toward social
diversity, and thus tend to resist further EU integration (Tillman 2013; de Vreese and
Boomgaarden 2005; Nelsen and Guth 2003). However, other research has found that
anti-immigration attitudes could go beyond fear of losing social cohesion and national
identity, and reflect people’s anxieties of losing access to economic resources. Antiimmigrant attitudes might reflect people’s wider prejudice and fears from the outgroups,
thus making anti-immigrant attitudes multidimensional, resulting not only from
perceived threats to personal values, and national identity but also to group resources
and security (de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005; Azrout et al. 2011). Since EU
integration leads to border removal within the EU, hence more immigration and its
economic consequences, fueling more opposition to further European integration
(Canan-Sokullu, 2011; Lubbers, 2008; van Klingeren et al., 2013; Kuhn, 2012; Lubbers
and Jaspers, 2011; Erisen and Erisen, 2014). Bearing in mind the differences between
the arguably inclusive Western European civic patriotism and the exclusionary Eastern
European ethnic nationalism, we expect that support for more EU integration to
positively predict support for more immigration from poor countries outside the
continent.
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3

METHODOLOGY

We test our argument with data from the European Social Survey, rounds 7 and 8. Our
dataset includes 19 countries, all participants of both rounds 7 and 8, which was our only
selection criteria. We operationalized our key independent variable, the European region,
by creating a variable which codes differently former communist countries from Eastern
Europe (Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia); the EU-member
Western European countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France Ireland, Germany, Great
Britain, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden); and two Western European countries
that are not EU members (Switzerland and Norway). Our selection method brought into the
dataset only former communist Eastern European countries that are now EU member
countries. Therefore, our dataset includes 72,015 observations, of which 22,011 are from
Eastern European countries, 43,966 from EU-member Western European countries, and
6,038 from non-EU Western European countries.
We tested a dependent variable that measured people’s support to allow more/less
immigrants from poor countries outside Europe, with responses spanning from “allow
more” = 1 to “allow some” = 2 to “allow few” = 3 to “allow none” = 4. It is obvious that
such responses represent categories of attitude measurement rather than attitudinal fixed
and exact points. It seems reasonable that lurking under the survey questions is a
continuous range of unobserved attitudes and policy preferences (with real values of
attitude presumably ranging from -∞ to +∞), normally distributed around the typical
(presumably mixed) perception of the policy and tapering off such that only very few
people greatly abhor or truly lust for more or no immigrants from poor countries outside
Europe. Therefore, ordered probit models would be most appropriate for this multivariate
analysis of normally distributed data. Also, because our data are nested in country settings,
but also because our argument about differences between the European West and European
East rests on a country/European geopolitical region level of analysis, multilevel regression
analysis would be the best strategy for our explanatory statistical analysis. And finally,
whereas there is a general consensus that weights should apply to descriptive statistics
(Kish & Frankel, 1974), there is no same level of consensus on whether weights should
routinely apply in regression analysis (Kott, 2007; Winship & Radbill, 1994). Therefore,
15

we opted to use weights only in our descriptive statistics, but considered that individual
level variables would modify for frequency and analytical weights, whereas multilevel
analysis would modify for country weights.
Aside from our key independent variables, we employ a number of control variables, most
of them derived from the extant literature. Thus, our models control for age (Markaki and
Longhi 2013; Smith Keller 2016; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007), gender (Markaki and
Longhi 2013; Smith Keller 2011; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Kunovich 2004),
education (Gordon and Arian 2001; Mayda 2006; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006),
unemployment (Klingeren et al. 2013; Markaki and Longhi 2013), being a member of a
discriminated minority in the country (Halapuu et al. 2013; Markaki and Longhi 2013),
position in the left-right ideological spectrum (Lahav 2002; Givens and Mohanty, 2014;
Karreth, Singh and Stojek, 2015) and concerns over security (Hellwig and Sinno, 2017).
It should be noted that causality between trust in institutions and attitudes toward
immigrants remains a contested issue. McLaren (2010, 2012) has established the causality
direction from attitudes toward immigrants toward trust in institutions; arguable, people
who perceive that immigrants threaten their communities are likely to trust less their elites
and institutions. On the contrary, arguing in favor of the opposite causal direction, Halapuu
et al. (2013) maintain that people with higher level of institutional trust could also be
treated as more risk-taking. Consequentially, institutional trust assumes a readiness to take
the risk of letting others (elites and institutions) make important decisions for oneself.
Accordingly, considering institutional trust as an indication of individual’s inclination
toward risk-taking behavior could justify the causal relationship between institutional trust
and attitudes towards immigrants. We find both positions unconvincing, and consider the
relationship between trust in institutions and attitudes toward immigrants to be locked in an
endogenous relationship and will always discuss their association rather than causality.
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4

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

We begin our analysis with some descriptive statistics. Table 1 comparatively describes the
distribution frequencies of the dependent variable. It becomes clear that not only support
for more immigrants from poor countries outside Europe has been lower in the Eastern
European countries in 2014 compared to both western regions, but obviously there are
significant differences between the European East and European West regarding the impact
of Europe’ 2015 refugee crisis on people’s preferences toward immigration influx into their
countries. The table shows that whereas in 2016 there is a growing number of people in
both the EU West and Non-EU West supporting more immigrants from outside Europe,
that number in the East has dropped in favor of those who support allowing none. Tables
2.1-2.3 show the mean differences between people’s preferences for more/less immigrants
from poor countries outside the continent as well as their statistical significance among
people of the three European geopolitical regions under discussion. Those results lend
support on our argument that people is East Europe tend to be less supportive of
immigration from outside the continent, and that the 2015 crisis impacted differently
attitudes on such in issue on both sides of the continent. Figures 1.1-1.3 visualize those
findings.
Table 1. Weighted frequencies of support for more/less immigrants from poor
countries outside Europe in each of the European regions and both ESS rounds.
EU East
EU West
Non-EU West
2014
2016
2014
2016
2014
2016
294.87
3,932.15 5,131.26
Allow
many 545.41
149.97
206.35
9.64
5.56
14.93
19.12
immigrants
13.74
18.56
Allow some
1,884.80 1,656.96
10,256.44 12,205.92
509.73
545.72
33.30
31.26
38.94
45.49
46.70
49.08
Allow few
2,040.98 2,037.28
8,241.02 7,175.79
368.32
303.26
36.06
38.44
31.29
26.74
33.74
27.27
Allow none
1,189.32 1,310.87
3,906.38 2,321.70
63.57
56.59
21.01
24.73
14.83
8.65
5.82
5.09
Total
5,660.51 5,299.97
26,335.99 26,834.67
1,091.60 1,111.92
100
100
100
100
100
100
Note: Results account for post-stratification and population weights. Percentages are in
italics below frequencies.
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Table 2. Comparing weighted means of support for
more/less immigrants from poor countries outside Europe
among EU East and EU West Europeans
EU East
EU West
Mean
se
Mean
se
p
**
2014
2.68
.02
2.46
.01
*

2016

2.82

.01

2.25

.01

**
*

***
***
p
Note: Results account for post-stratification and population
weights. *** p (Ha: diff ≠ 0) < 0.001

Table 3. Comparing weighted means of support for
more/less immigrants from poor countries outside Europe
among EU East and Non-EU West Europeans
EU East
Non-EU West
Mean
se
Mean
se
p
***
2014
2.68
.02
2.32
.02
***
2016
2.82
.01
2.19
.02
***
***
p
Note: Results account for post-stratification and population
weights. *** p (Ha: diff ≠ 0) < 0.001

Table 4. Comparing weighted means of support for
more/less immigrants from poor countries outside Europe
among East and West Europeans
EU West
Non-EU West
Mean
se
Mean
se
p
***
2014
2.46
.01
2.32
.02
**
2016
2.25
.01
2.19
.02
***
***
p
Note: Results account for post-stratification and population
weights. *** p (Ha: diff ≠ 0) < 0.001 and ** p (Ha: diff ≠ 0) <
0.01
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Figure 1.1. Attitude differences toward allowing more/less immigrants from poor countries outside Europe: East Europe
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Figure 1.2. Attitude differences toward allowing more/less immigrants from poor countries outside Europe: EU West Europe
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Figure 1.3. Attitude differences toward allowing more/less immigrants from poor countries outside Europe: Non-EU West Europe
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We develop our explanatory analysis with Models 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 in Table 3. The
statistical significance of the random effects at 99.99 percent confidence level testifies in
favor of our multilevel analysis strategy. Moreover, the regression results show that,
whereas there is a tendency in the European West to associate attitudes toward
immigrations either with trust in country’s politicians and national parliaments (the non-EU
West) or country’s politicians, political parties and national parliaments (the EU West), it
seems that people in the EU East do not make such an association. The only model where
the variable “trust in political parties” carries statistical significance (at 99 percent
confidence level) is Model 1.2 (the EU West), and in this case it shows a positive
association with opposition to immigration (the more people trust political parties, the more
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they oppose immigration). This is quite opposite with the association that people make
between trust in other domestic actors, namely politicians and national parliament on the
one side, and attitudes toward more/less immigration. Therefore, whereas there is no
evidence in the EU East to support any association between trust in domestic politicians
and institutions with support for immigration, there is evidence that Western Europeans
would associate trust in domestic politicians and institutions with attitudes toward
immigration. However, such an evidence uncovers also some inconsistencies. Both in the
EU West and the non-EU West, more trust in politicians and national parliaments seems to
predict support for more immigrants from poor countries outside Europe. However,
whereas there is no evidence in the non-EU West of any association between trust in
political parties and attitudes toward immigration, in the EU West more trust in political
parties predicts less support for immigration from outside the continent. We will discuss
these results more below.
In turn, people in EU member countries, both in its eastern and western sides, strongly
associate their preferences for more/less immigration from poor countries outside the
continent with their trust in the European Parliament: the more they trust the European
Parliament, the more immigrants from poor countries outside Europe they seem to favor.
Meanwhile, understandingly, people in the non-EU West seem not to make such
association. Whereas we expected this association of trust in European Parliament with
attitudes toward immigration in the continent, it represents the only case where an
institution, the European Parliament, emerges as a cue provides for citizens of the EU East
at a 95 percent confidence level. Also, the negative sign of the β coefficient indicates that
higher trust in the European Parliament associates support by EU citizens in both East and
West for more immigration. These results also highlight that, whereas it seems that citizens
of the EU West tend to find immigration policy responsibility at both domestic and EU
political actors, people in the EU East find the locus of such a responsibility only at EU
actors, and people from the non-EU West locate such a responsibility only with domestic
actors.
Moreover, the negative sign of the β coefficient for the “EU integration has gone too far”
variable indicates that people in all of European regions discussed here associate the
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dimension on EU integration with their preferences for more/less immigrants form poor
countries outside Europe. The strong statistical significance of such a relationship (at 99.99
percent confidence level) turns these findings into empirical evidence in favor of our claim
that viewing the EU integration as having gone too far predicts opposing more immigration
from poor countries outside Europe, and supporting more EU integration predicts support
for such immigration. Our findings corroborate extant literature discussed earlier, arguing
that people see European integration as either promoting or supporting immigration through
both imposing European immigration policies on sovereign countries and the road to lax
border regimes and free movement across national borders.
Table 5. Predictive models of Europeans’ attitudes toward more/less migration from
poor countries outside Europe
DV: Allow more/less (1-4) immigrants
from poor countries outside Europe

MODEL 1.1
EU EAST

MODEL 1.2
EU WEST

Model: Mixed-effects ordered probit
Age
Gender
Years of education
Unemployed
Member of a discriminated minority
Trust country’s politicians
Trust country’s political parties
Trust in national parliament
Trust in European Parliament
Trust in people
Left-right ideological orientation
Level of interest in politics
Feeling safe walking locally after dark
EU integration has gone too far
Post-crisis interview (ESS 8 (2016))

Coeff
.01 (.00)
-.09 (.02)
-.04 (.00)
-.05 (.05)
.07 (.04)
-.00 (.01)
.00 (.01)
-.01 (.01)
-.02 (.00)
-.04 (.00)
.03 (.00)
.06 (.00)
.03 (.01)
-.08 (.00)
.08 (.02)

p

Cut point 1
Cut point 2
Cut point 3
Random effects
Country
Log likelihood
Observations

-2.15 (.20)
-.79 (.20)
.37 (.20)

***

.16 (.10)
-17405.70
15472

***

***
***
***

***
***
***
***
*
***
***

***

NOTE: Standard errors are in parenthesis besides the β coefficients.
for p < .05.

MODEL 1.3
NON-EU WEST

Coeff
.01 (.00)
-.13 (.01)
-.04 (.00)
.01 (.03)
.14 (.02)
-.01 (.01)
.01 (.01)
-.02 (.00)
-.01 (.00)
-.06 (.00)
.11 (.00)
.12 (.01)
.13 (.01)
-.09 (.00)
-.18 (.01)

p

-1.24 (.11)
-.19 (.11)
1.36 (.11)

***

.09 (.04)
-40814.99
36288

***

***

***
***
***

***
**
*
**
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

***

is for p < .001;

**

Coeff
.01 (.00)
-.06 (.03)
-.03 (.00)
-.01 (.10)
.13 (.07)
-.04 (.01)
.02 (.01)
-.03 (.01)
-.02 (.01)
-.04 (.01)
.16 (.01)
.10 (.02)
.08 (.03)
-.09 (.01)
-.16 (.03)

p

-.89 (.21)
.71 (.21)
2.15 (.22)

***

.02 (.02)
-5121.75
4964

***

***

***

*

*

***
***
***
**
***
***

*
***

is for p < .01; * is
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The “Post-crisis interview” variable intends to capture the effect of the 2015 refugee crisis
in people’s attitudes toward immigration as measured during the 8th ESS round. The effects
are statistically significant in all the three models, and the directional signs go according to
our hypothesis: whereas the 2015 refugee crisis caused more opposition to immigration
from poor countries outside the continent among citizens of the EU East, it pumped up
support for such an immigration in both EU and non-EU Western European countries. This
is evidence that nationalist exclusionism lingers among Eastern Europeans while Western
Europeans seem more generous regarding newcomers in their societies.
Now, let have a look at the behavior of the control variables. Age, years of education, trust
in people, left-right ideological orientation and level of interest in politics and all have their
directional signs pointing to the same direction, and they all carry statistical significance at
the 99.99 percent confidence level across the three geopolitical regions under discussion.
Another variable, feeling safe walking locally after dark, also carries the same directional
sign throughout the three regions―suggesting that concerns over personal safety negatively
impact preferences for more immigrants―but its association with the dependent variable
display varying statistical significance among the three regions, with a 95 percent
confidence level in the EU East, 99.99 percent confidence level in the EU West, and 99
percent confidence level in the non-EU West. This strong evidence attest the
transcendentally nature of those stable determinants and correlates in predicting people’s
attitudes toward more/less immigration. Also, the results suggest an attitudinal gender gap
in the EU member countries from both East and West, where being a male strongly predicts
an inclination toward allowing more immigrants. However, there is no evidence of such a
gender gap in the non-EU West, and there seems to be no evidence that being unemployed
could in any way affect people’s attitudes toward immigration. Also, being a member of a
discriminated minority positively affects support for more immigrants from poor countries
outside Europe.
What intrigues us most in these findings is the opposite directional sign that associates
attitudes toward immigration and trust in political parties in the EU West. How can we
explain the finding that the directional sign of the association between trust in political
parties in this geopolitical region and attitudes toward immigration from poor countries
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outside Europe goes in the opposite direction of the association and politicians, national
parliaments and the European Parliament with attitudes toward such immigration? This
might have to do with the unique and powerful role that political parties play in shaping
attitudes. Recent research in political psychology views political parties as mechanisms that
facilitates the application of predispositions to political decisions

(Leeper and Slothuus,

2014). This relationship is different from that between people and state institutions, which
views people’s preferences as system inputs, and public policies as system outputs (Mettler
and Soss 2004). Therefore, the opposite directional sign of EU Westerners’ support for
more immigrants with trust in political parties compared with the same association of the
dependent variable with trust in domestic politicians and national parliaments as well as
with the European Parliament might show that political parties are leading the immigration
debate in the EU West, and thus shaping immigration attitudes accordingly. However, it
remains unclear why political parties manage to influence the immigration debate in the EU
West and not in the other two geopolitical regions discussed in this research.
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5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECCOMENDATIONS

Whereas we cannot claim a blunt “No” to our original answer on whether or not public
opinions on the two halves of the European continent, East and West, are beginning to
converge, at least on immigration issues, we can still see stark differences in attitudes
presumably determined by differing political cultures associated with differing types on
national identities. However, other differences seem to emerge from more recent
institutional developments, especially the perception of policy responsibility location on
immigration issues. Therefore, whether there seem to be a convergence of people’s
attitudes on immigration from poor countries outside the continent around some more
individualistic―and rather stable―socioeconomic and socio-psychological factors such
as age, gender, education, left-right ideological orientation, level of interest in politics
and feeling safe walking locally after dark, there is less convergence on the relationship
that they build around some more structurally-informed attitudes such as the impact of
crises and trust in institutions.
Thus, assuming differences in political culture between East and West, as well as the
role that various institutional settings would play in such attitudes, we expected that
people in the East would be less welcoming toward immigrants from poor countries
outside Europe than their counterparts from the West. Moreover, taking into account the
exclusionary nature of the ethnic nationalism in the East and the inclusionary nature of
the civic patriotism in the West, we expected that the 2015 European refugee crisis
would make Eastern Europeans less willing to accept more immigrants, and Western
Europeans more willing to admit immigrants. Our findings vindicated our expectations.
Second, building on the extant literature, we argued that Eastern European ethnic
nationalism, distrustful as it is toward domestic politicians and institutions, would
correlate such distrust with aversion toward more immigrants in the continent, whereas
Western European nationalism would associate their trust in domestic politicians and
institutions with support for more immigrants from poor countries outside Europe.
Results showed no evidence that EU Easterners’ trust in domestic politicians, political
parties and national parliaments affect their attitudes toward immigration, but showed
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supporting results for EU and non-EU member countries from the West, with trust in
political parties being an aberration. We saw that the association of attitudes toward
immigration from poor countries outside Europe with trust in political parties is
statistically insignificant in the EU East and the non-EU West, but it is statistically
significant in the EU West. However, in the latter case, the directional sign of that
association takes the opposite direction from the association of the dependent variable
with trust in politicians, national parliaments and the European Parliament.
Whereas our analysis showed that institutional setting seems to encroach upon the ethnic
nationalism versus civic patriotism dichotomy, both approaches seemed helpful in
finding answers. Whereas the latter would help to predict differences in people’s
attitudes toward immigration from outside the continent, the former would help to
explain differences in determinants and correlates of such attitudes. Moreover, people’s
responsibility assignment on domestic institutions requires much to explain: whereas
people in the EU West associate their attitudes toward immigration with trust in
domestic politicians, political parties (in the case of the EU West), and national
parliaments, people in the EU East do not make such association between the attitudes
toward immigration and national politicians and institutions. However, like people in the
EU West, they associate the dependent variable with the European Parliament, an
association absent in responses of people from the non-EU West. These findings are
instructive as to where people find the locus of responsibility of immigration policies,
and there seem to be different patterns between the EU East, where people find in at the
European institutions; the EU West, where people find it with both domestic politicians,
political parties and national parliaments as well as the European Parliament; and the
non EU West, where people find such responsibility with only national politicians and
parliaments.
As usually, while trying to answer our original research questions, other questions
emerged. First,
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